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Abstract This paper reports an experiment designed to test whether prior consul-
tation within a group affects subsequent individual decision-making in tasks where
demonstrability of correct solutions is low. In our experiment, subjects considered two
paintings created by two different artists and were asked to guess which artist made
each painting. We observed answers given by individuals under two treatments: In
one, subjects were allowed the opportunity to consult with other participants before
making their private decisions; in the other, there was no such opportunity. Our pri-
mary findings are that subjects in the first treatment evaluate the opportunity to consult
positively, but they perform significantly worse and earn significantly less.
Keywords Consultation · Decision-making · Group decisions · Individual decisions
JEL Classification C91 · C92 · D80
1 Introduction
Consultation is a key ingredient of many deliberative processes. In many walks of
life, individuals consult with others before taking important decisions. Obvious exam-
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ples include investors consulting with financial advisors or individuals talking with
health professionals when choosing between alternative medical interventions. With
the growth of the internet, sources of ‘advice’ are expanding rapidly, while the costs
of accessing them are often very low. But here, as in the examples mentioned above,
the quality of advice obtained may be difficult to assess, raising interesting questions
about the conditions under which consulting with others can be expected to improve
(or worsen) individual decision-making.
One body of literature which might inform understanding of the influence of con-
sultation on individual decisions is the extensive research examining the comparative
success of decisions made by individuals versus decisions made by groups. There is
now considerable evidence that groups can often ‘outperform’ individuals. The bulk
of it comes from experiments in social psychology examining behavior in decision
problems that have correct solutions and thus have a meaningful criterion for assess-
ing decision accuracy. Within this literature, a widely reported finding is that groups
are more likely to report the correct answer (see, e.g., Hastie 1986; Laughlin et al.
2003 October, 2006, and references therein). Economists have also compared individ-
ual and group decisions. A relatively small literature has investigated the incidence
of preference ‘anomalies’ comparing groups and individuals, where one of the first
contributions is Bone et al. (1999). A larger literature, starting with Cason and Mui
(1997) and Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), has focused on interactive decisions where a
common result is that groups’ decisions more closely track standard game theoretic
predictions.
The fact that groups often perform better than individuals suggests the possibility
that consultation with others, prior to an individual decision, might also have improv-
ing effects. There is, however, limited evidence of how deliberation within a group
affects the quality of a later individual decision: Maciejovsky et al. (2013) report that
subjects who have solved decision problems as part of a group subsequently perform
better as individuals in similar decision tasks; Charness et al. (2010) find that group
consultation mitigates some decision anomalies found in individual choice experi-
ments. While these recent results chime with the broader literature comparing the
success of individuals and groups, like many of the studies reviewed by Hastie (1986),
both of them also share a design feature which may limit their scope: that feature is
the use of tasks which have demonstrably correct solutions.1
We will say that the solution to a decision problem is fully demonstrable, in a given
context, when someone who knows it (or how to identify it) can convey that knowledge
to other individuals facing the same decision.2 In previous research, demonstrability
has usually been implemented using tasks which have correct answers (e.g., multiply-
ing two numbers together or finding the solution to a logical reasoning problem such as
1 Also related is the paper by Sausgruber and Tyran (2011) who study voting on tax regimes in an exper-
imental market. They examine whether deliberation mitigates a ‘tax-shifting bias’ whereby buyers/voters
believe that taxing sellers comes at a lower economic cost than taxing themselves. They find that deliber-
ation does not eliminate the bias. As in Charness et al. (2010) and Maciejovsky et al. (2013), also the task
used in Sausgruber and Tyran (2011) has a solution which is in principle ‘demonstrable.’ Differently from
these studies, however, the decision setting in Sausgruber and Tyran (2011) displays decision externalities
within groups as subjects get paid as a function of the votes made in their group.
2 A richer discussion of the concept of demonstrability is provided by Laughlin and Ellis (1986).
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Wason’s selection task). In such cases, while some individuals may not independently
find the correct solution, the task is demonstrable if they will recognize the solution
when presented with suitable arguments to identify it.
High demonstrability of solutions may be an important ingredient explaining the
relative success of groups over individuals across a range of existing experimental
findings.3 But it is not obvious that demonstrability is characteristic of most settings in
the world where individuals seek advice from others. In fact, ‘experts’ or ‘professional’
advisors often encounter difficulties in providing compelling arguments in defense of
their estimations of, say, the research publication potential of different candidates in an
academic job market, the payoff from a particular model of corporate re-branding, the
profitability of a proposed investment, or the risks associated with a new drug treatment.
Indeed, such cases are often characterized by disagreements in the assessments of
professionals.
In this paper, we examine the effect of consultation on individual decision-making
in a task designed to have low demonstrability by comparing behavior across two
treatments. In one treatment, before facing the decision, subjects discussed the task
with other participants. We compare decisions made by these subjects with those made
in a control group who had no opportunity to discuss the task with others. Notice that
our study differs from the literature which compares the decisions of groups with those
of single individuals because our study focuses on whether deliberating with others
has an impact on subsequent individual decision-making.
Our primary findings are that subjects who had the opportunity to consult reported
that it was helpful, but they actually performed worse and earned less than those who
had no such opportunity. This effect is partly driven by a tendency for individuals
to form consensus around uniformed opinion, a result which, as we discuss further
below, has some resonance with the ‘groupthink’ phenomena reported widely in social
psychology.
2 Experimental design and procedures
We use a decision task which is designed to have a correct solution known to the
experimenter but for which demonstrability is low. All of the subjects in our experiment
faced a pair of decision problems in which they were asked to consider two paintings.
For each painting, subjects had to select which of two artists, Paul Klee or Wassily
Kandinsky, had made the painting.4 Subjects received £1.50 for each correct answer
(and nothing for any incorrect answer). Figure 1 shows the computer screen that
subjects used to submit their answers.
3 This point is also made by, e.g., Hastie (1986), who reviews the social psychology literature comparing
group and individual behavior in relation to tasks with varying degrees of solution demonstrability. Whereas
groups clearly outperform individuals in tasks where solutions are easily demonstrated, the comparison is
less clear in tasks where solutions are more difficult to demonstrate: Here groups seem to perform slightly
better than the average individual, but usually below the level of the best performing individual.
4 The two paintings were Monument in Fertile Country, 1929 by Paul Klee (painting A in the experiment),
and Weighing, 1928 by Wassily Kandinsky (painting B). A similar task is also used by Chen and Li (2009)
as part of a social identity manipulation.
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Fig. 1 The decision task
We contend that this task has relatively low demonstrability5 because the solutions
to our painting tasks cannot be identified via the application of any system of reasoning
that would be commonly understood by our subjects.6
Each subject took part in either the Individual or Consultation treatment. In the
Consultation treatment, the decision task was preceded by a ‘group-discussion’ stage
where subjects were randomly divided into three groups of six. After being assigned
to a group, subjects took part in a computerized chat where they could discuss the task
for 5 minutes with other group members before submitting their answers. Subjects
knew that messages were only shared among the members of their own group. At the
end of the 5 minutes, subjects individually submitted their answers. In the Individual
treatment, by contrast, there was no ‘group-discussion’ stage before the decision task.
Note that in both treatments subjects made private decisions as individuals. Thus,
our study provides a controlled test of whether being able to discuss the task with
others has an impact on subsequent individual performance as compared to a baseline
situation (the Individual treatment) where group deliberation is not possible.
At the end of the experiment, there was a short questionnaire eliciting demographic
and attitudinal information.7 This included self-assessment of risk attitudes (the SOEP
general risk question) and trust attitudes (the WVS Trust question). In the data analysis,
responses on these two questions enter as controls in a regression of subjects’ responses
to the painting task.
5 Our task is similar in spirit to some of the low-demonstrability tasks used in the social psychology
literature, such as world knowledge questions (e.g., ‘what is the capital city of Lithuania?’) or estimation
tasks (e.g., ‘what is the population of China?’).
6 We do not rule out the possibility that there may be arguments that a community of art experts might
recognize as identifying the correct responses to our task (perhaps involving, for example, references to the
style of brush strokes used by the different artists). Our subjects, however, were not selected on the basis
of, or expected to have, any particular expertise in art history.
7 The decision task reported here was the first part of a larger experiment and was followed by a one-shot
sequential principal-agent game which is not related to the question examined in this paper.
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Fig. 2 Distribution of correct answers across treatments
A total of 342 subjects took part (270 in the Consultation treatment). Subjects were
students recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) had an average age 20.2 years, and 50 %
were female. Subjects’ earnings from the task ranged from £0.00 to £3.00, averaging
£1.34. The experiment was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
The software and full instructions are available on request to the authors.
3 Results
3.1 Does consultation improve decision-making?
Figure 2 shows the distribution of correct answers in the Individual and Consultation
treatments. In the Individual treatment (top panel) 38 % of the subjects answer correctly
to both painting questions, 33 % answer correctly to one question, and 29 % submit
two wrong answers.
In the Consultation treatment, the fraction of subjects correctly answering both
questions is similar to that in the Individual treatment (36 % in Consultation). However,
the two treatments differ markedly in the proportions of subjects with either zero or
one correct answer. In Consultation, the proportion of subjects submitting two wrong
answers is 51 %, while only 13 % of subjects submit one correct answer. We strongly
reject the hypothesis that the distribution of correct answers is the same across the
two treatments: χ2(2d f ) = 18.91; p < 0.001. On average subjects in the Consultation
treatment were less successful in identifying the correct painters and consequently
they also earned less (earnings were 22 % lower than in the Individual treatment: z =
2.14; p = 0.032; two- sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
We note that the statistical tests reported above do not account for group inter-
dependencies in the Consultation treatment; therefore, we proceed by analyzing the
distribution of correct answers also using regression analysis. We use a generalized
ordered logit regression model where the dependent variable records whether a subject
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answers correctly to zero, one, or two questions.8 In Model I, the only independent
variable is a treatment dummy (= 1 for the Consultation treatment). Model II adds
controls for personal characteristics (gender, a dummy indicating whether a subject
studies Humanities, and a self-assessment of the subject’s risk and trust attitudes), and
for session effects.9 Model III introduces interactions between the treatment dummy
and the other regressors. Table 1 reports the regression results, displayed as factor
changes in the odds of answering correctly. Note that a value >1 (resp. <1) implies a
positive (resp. negative) effect on the odds of answering correctly.
Model I shows that being in the Consultation treatment reduces substantially (by a
factor of 0.394) the odds of submitting at least one correct answer. In the Individual
treatment (the benchmark condition), we expect to find approximately 2.43 subjects
submitting at least one correct answer for every subject who submits no correct answer,
in Consultation the same statistic falls to only (0.394×2.43 =) 0.96. This effect is
significant at the 1 % level. Being in the Consultation treatment, however, has no
significant impact on the odds of answering correctly to both questions (odds are
reduced only by a factor of 0.919, p = 0.810). This is consistent with the intuitively
plausible idea that those who know more are less likely to be swayed by the crowd.
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for personal characteristics and
session effects (Model II). In Model III, among the interaction terms, only the one
between the treatment and gender dummies is significant (10 % level). Interestingly,
the model reveals that consultation is especially detrimental for females with the odds
of at least one correct answer falling dramatically (by a factor of 0.088; p=0.007). For
male participants, the effect is smaller (the odds decrease by a factor of 0.204) and it is
only marginally significant (χ2(1d f ) = 3.45; p=0.063). For female subjects, being in
the Consultation treatment also reduces the odds of answering both questions correctly
although the effect is only significant at the 10 % level (the effect is insignificant for
males).
3.2 The unrecognized curse of consensus
Why would the opportunity to consult with others have generated lower performance?
A very striking feature of our data is a tendency for subjects in groups to give the
same answers to the painting questions as those given by other members of their
group. In approximately 84 % of groups, an absolute majority of members submitted
8 The generalized ordered logit regression model allows relaxation of the ‘parallel regression assumption’
of the standard ordered logit model whereby the coefficients that describe the relationship between, e.g.,
submitting zero correct answers versus submitting one or more correct answers are the same as those that
describe the relationship between submitting two correct answers versus submitting zero or one correct
answers, etc. (see, e.g., Long and Freese 2006). This assumption is violated for the three regression models
presented in Table 1 according to a Brant test (in all models p < 0.05). The test also showed that the largest
violations were for the treatment dummy. Thus, we used the command gologit2 in STATA 11 to estimate
generalized ordered logit regressions where the parallel regression assumption was relaxed for the treatment
dummy and maintained for other regressors.
9 The variable labeled ‘Session’ in Table 1 is an index of the order in which sessions were run (1, 2, 3, etc.).
We include this to check whether there might have been some change in knowledge across the sequence of
sessions. As we expected, the variable is insignificant.
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identical answers to the two questions. About a third of the groups (14 out of 45)
were unanimous in that all group members submitted the same answers; in another 24
groups, a majority (of four or five) submitted identical answers. This tendency arose
even though participants submitted their answers individually, in private, and with no
suggestion anywhere in the instructions that a group had to reach consensus.
Whether or not a group reached a consensus is strongly associated with subjects’
evaluations of whether communicating with the other group members was a helpful
input to the decision task. At the end of the experiment, but before being informed
about the outcome of the decision task, subjects in the Consultation treatment were
asked to rate how much they thought that communicating with other members of their
group had helped them solve the two painting questions. They responded on a scale
from 1 (‘not at all helpful’) to 10 (‘extremely helpful’).10 From these responses, we
constructed a ‘helpfulness index’ as the mean of reported values for each group. For
the 14 unanimous groups, the average helpfulness index is 6.56. This falls to 4.75 in
the 24 groups where a majority of members submitted identical answers and to 2.40 in
the 7 groups where no answer was submitted by an absolute majority. Both reductions
are highly significant (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum tests give p < 0.005 for both
comparisons).
The sting in the tail is that the poor performance in the Consultation treatment
seems to be driven by those subjects who gave answers consistent with an absolute
majority in their group. If we exclude from the Consultation data, all those subjects
who formed part of a majority, we then find no significant difference between the
average earnings of this subset (£1.438) and the average earnings of those in the
Individual treatment (£1.625) (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=0.92; p=0.355).
By contrast, average earnings in the Consultation treatment of those in majorities
(£1.203) are significantly lower than those for the Individual treatment (two-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z= 2.43; p=0.015). One might wonder whether this inferior
performance of majorities relative to subjects in the Individual treatment just reflects
sorting according to knowledge, which results in relatively low representation of the
better informed individuals among majorities. But while such sorting may account
for some differential between subsets of subjects in two treatments, it cannot explain
the overall difference in performance between treatments reported in the previous
sub-section.
The face value interpretation of these data is that consensus makes you feel good
and perform worse. There is of course considerable evidence from social psychology
that individuals have a strong tendency to form consensus, even when there is no
basis for it.11 But an intriguing question is why majorities should have a tendency
to coalesce around the wrong answers. We examine this in the next sub-section via
analysis of the chat data from the Consultation treatment.
10 The average response was 4.95 (s.d. 3.17).
11 For discussion of some early evidence see Sherif (1935).
123
Does consultation improve decision-making? 385
Table 2 Percentage of correct suggestions about the paintings
% of correct suggestions
Overall (%) Initial
suggestions (%)
Subsequent suggestions
following a correct
suggestion (%)
Subsequent suggestions
following an incorrect
suggestion (%)
Painting A 35 31 65 27
Painting B 50 44 57 37
3.3 The origins of consensus: insights from the chat data
In the Consultation treatment, subjects used a computer program to ‘chat’ with other
group members. All but two of the 270 subjects sent at least one message, a total
of 2,198 messages were exchanged (8.14 messages for the average individual). We
coded messages and classified as ‘suggestions’ all cases where a subject explicitly
suggested the artist of one of the paintings.12 In total, 42 (about 6.5 %) of messages
were classified as containing suggestions.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for correct suggestions. Notice that suggestions
made within a group tend to be correlated with initial suggestions influencing subse-
quent ones. In particular, for painting A, we find that when the first suggestion made
in a group is correct, 65 % of the subsequent suggestions are also correct. However,
following an incorrect initial suggestion, only 27 % of the subsequent suggestions are
correct. Similarly, the probability of correctly identifying painting B is 57 % if the
initial suggestion in the group is correct and 37 % if the initial suggestion is incorrect.
Thus, there is a tendency among subjects in the Consultation treatment to develop a
consensus of opinions around the answers that are first suggested in their group.
This consensus of opinions in the chat messages translates into a consensus of
actions in the decision task. This is particularly evident in those groups where subjects
receive homogeneous suggestions about which artists made which painting, i.e., in
groups where all suggestions identify the same artist as the painter of a painting.13
In 23 groups, subjects received homogeneous suggestions about painting A. In six
groups, the homogeneous suggestion is correct and 69 % of subjects in these groups
made the correct choice. In the remaining 17 groups, the homogeneous suggestion is
incorrect and the probability of making the correct choice dropped to 12 %. Similarly,
for the 27 groups with homogeneous suggestions for painting B, the probability of
12 Two examples of messages classified as suggestions are: ‘i’d say the left one must’ve been made by klee’
and ‘i would go for Kandinsky for a’. We do not consider as suggestions messages indicating agreement
with suggestions made by others (e.g., ‘I would agree Kadinsky A and Klee B’; ‘im going with klee for A
too’). We tested the robustness of our classification by having a research assistant independently code the
messages.
13 This occurs in 66 % of the groups where painting A is discussed, and in 84 % of the groups where
painting B is discussed. Note that homogeneous suggestions can occur either because there are different
group members making the same suggestion about a painting (this is the case in 36 % of groups with
homogeneous suggestions), or because only one person makes a suggestion (64 % of cases).
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choosing the correct painter in the decision task is 82 % in the 11 groups with correct
suggestions and 19 % in the 16 groups with incorrect suggestions.14
Overall, these findings reveal a strong tendency of subjects to form a consensus
around the suggestions made in their group during the chat-discussion phase of the
experiment. Suggestions initially made in a group influenced subsequent suggestions
leading to a consensus of opinions. Partly as a result of this, in a large fraction of groups,
subjects received homogeneous suggestions about the paintings. Choices made in these
groups are strongly influenced by the suggestions observed in the group-discussion
phase, i.e., we observe a consensus of actions around the suggestions made in a group.
This may reflect something akin to the ‘drive toward consensus’ which Janis (1972)
famously characterized as ‘groupthink.’ Several studies from social psychology, dating
at least to Asch (1951), have illustrated how group pressures may lead individuals to
conform to answers given by confederates, even when these are incorrect. (For a review
see Esser 1998).
Perhaps more surprisingly, we find that subjects who are willing to make a sug-
gestion typically make poor suggestions: About 60 % of the suggestions made in the
chat-discussion phase are wrong. If we consider suggestions as a proxy for knowl-
edge among those in the Consultation treatment who are willing to suggest their guess
to others, and compare the proportion of correct suggestions with the proportion of
correct decisions made in the Individual treatment, we find that these do not differ
for painting B (50 % correct suggestions in Consultation vs. 44 % correct decisions in
Individual, χ2 (1df) = 0.39; p=0.532), whereas they are significantly different for
painting A (35 vs. 64 %, χ2 (1df) = 13.91; p < 0.001). This result holds if we only
focus on initial suggestions made in a group (p=0.002 for painting A and p=0.948
for painting B).15
These results suggest a tendency in the Consultation treatment for the less informed
individuals to be relatively more likely to promote their guess to others.16 A possible
explanation for this may be the existence of a positive correlation between, on the
one hand, an individual’s confidence that they know the answer and their willing-
ness to suggest their guess to others and, on the other hand, between overconfidence
and incompetence (e.g., Kruger and Dunning 1999). This, coupled with the strong
tendency of subjects to form a consensus around the suggestions observed in their
group regardless of their correctness, may suggest a possible mechanism at work in
our experiment that induced subjects in groups to coalesce around wrong answers.
14 In 17 groups, subjects receive heterogeneous suggestions about the paintings. In these groups, choices
are more diverse but most subjects tended to follow the suggestion made by at least 50 % of group members.
15 One may wonder whether subjects deliberately made wrong suggestions. This does not seem to be the
case. The vast majority of subjects tended to follow the suggestion they made in the group, regardless of
whether the suggestion was right or wrong.
16 Notice that this is quite distinct from the familiar ‘hidden profile problem’ (see for example, Lightle et
al. 2009) in which individuals fail to share information which may inform an optimal decision. Our data,
instead, point to active sharing of incorrect information.
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4 Conclusion
We have reported an experiment designed to test the influence of consultation on
individual decision-making. Our work is partly motivated by an extensive background
literature which finds that groups often outperform individuals and we interpret our
study as probing the conditions under which group interaction improves decision-
making. As we noted, most of the evidence supporting conclusions of the form ‘teams
make you smarter’ comes from experiments comparing decisions made by groups
versus decisions made by individuals. However, we have argued that many interesting
and important decisions where groups may play a role are better construed as individual
decisions with an element of consultation, and part of our objective was to examine
the extent to which the beneficial effects established for decisions made by groups
extend to decisions made by individuals who consult.
A second distinguishing feature of our experiment was the use of a task with a
(correct) solution which is low on demonstrability. This design feature had a number
of connected motivations discussed in the introduction and reviewed here. The first
stems from recognizing that the bulk of evidence pointing to beneficial effects of group
decisions might be partly a by-product of experimental designs featuring tasks with
high demonstrability. Indeed, when tasks have fully demonstrable solutions then, by
definition, those who have knowledge of them can convey their knowledge to others.
As such, adopting tasks with low demonstrability can be seen as providing a tougher
test of the extent to which the knowledge possessed by some members of a group
can be successfully transmitted to other members of it. That test is relevant, not least,
because many interesting decisions in the world—and, in particular, many of those
where consulting is commonplace—tend to have low demonstrability.
Our primary finding is that beneficial effects of group participation do not extend to
our environment because of a tendency for individuals to follow the relatively poorly
informed crowd, and this effect was particularly marked for females.
It is conceivable that consultation may lead to better outcomes in other settings, even
when demonstrability is low. This may happen, for example, where there is substantial
initial knowledge about the decision problem among individuals. Our findings, how-
ever, highlight that consultation does not always lead to better outcomes. A systematic
analysis of the conditions under which consultation may positively or negatively effect
decision-making seems a promising avenue for further research.
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